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Abstract
This paper develops a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
model to evaluate the economic repercussions of cryptocurrency. We assume
that cryptocurrency offers an alternative currency option to government
currency for households and we have an endogenous supply and demand
for cryptocurrency. We estimate our model with Bayesian techniques
using monthly data for the period 2013:M6-2019:M3. Our results indicate
a substitution effect between the real balances of government currency
and cryptocurrency in response to technology, preferences and monetary
policy shocks. In addition, real balances of cryptocurrency exhibit a
countercyclical reaction to these shocks. Moreover, we find that government
currency demand shocks have larger effects on the economy than shocks
to cryptocurrency demand. Our results also show that cryptocurrency
productivity shocks have negative effects on output and on the exchange rate
between government currency and cryptocurrency, with a more pronounced
negative reaction to output if the central bank increases its weight to
government currency growth. Overall, our results provide novel insights
on the underlying mechanisms of cryptocurrency and spillover effects to the
economy.
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1 Introduction
Cryptocurrency has recently gained considerable interest from investors,
central banks and governments worldwide. There are numerous reasons
for this intensified attention. For example, Japan and South Korea have
recognised Bitcoin as a legal method of payment (Bloomberg, 2017a;
Cointelegraph, 2017). Some central banks are exploring the possibility of
using cryptocurrency (Bloomberg, 2017c). Moreover, a large number of
companies and banks created the Enterprise Ethereum Alliance1 in order to
customize Ethereum for industry players (Forbes, 2017). Finally, the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange (CME) started the Bitcoin futures on 18th December
2017 (Chicago Mercantile Exchange, 2017).2
In this paper, we develop and estimate a Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium (DSGE) model in order to evaluate the economic repercussions
of cryptocurrency. Our model includes demand and supply of cryptocurrency
by extending and reformulating standard DSGE models with money (see,
among the others, Nelson, 2002, Christiano et al., 2005, Ireland, 2004)
with the new sector of the economy related to cryptocurrency. Our
analysis allows us to compare the responses of real money balances for
government currency and cryptocurrency to several demand and supply
shocks driving the economy. Moreover, we are able to evaluate the response
of main macroeconomic fundamentals to productivity shocks for production
of cryptocurrency.
In 2017 the value of cryptocurrencies experienced an exponential growth
and their market capitalization substantially increased. However, the
volatility of cryptocurrencies has been very significant with regular daily
swings up to 30%. Figure 1 provides evidence of these characteristics by
1Source: https://entethalliance.org/members/.
2Nasdaq and Tokyo Financial Exchange followed in 2018 (Bloomberg, 2017b; Tokyo
Financial Exchange, 2017).
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showing the Coinbase Index (CBI).3
Bitcoin, the first decentralized cryptocurrency created in 2009 and
documented in Nakamoto (2009), had grown in 2017 to a maximum of
about 2,700% price return, and in the same year, some cryptocurrencies
had achieved far higher growth than Bitcoin. Some economists, famous
investors, and finance professionals warned that rapidly increasing prices of
cryptocurrencies could cause the “bubble” to burst. In fact, in early 2018, a
large sell-off of cryptocurrencies occurred. From January to February 2018,
the price of Bitcoin fell 65%, and by the end of the first quarter of 2018, the
entire cryptocurrency market fell by 54%, with losses in the market topping
500 USD billion. The decline of the cryptocurrency market was larger than
the bursting of the Dot-com bubble in 2002. In November 2018, the total
market capitalization for Bitcoin fell below 100 USD billion for the first
time since October 2017, and the Bitcoin price fell below 5,000 USD. More
recently, the Bitcoin price has partially recovered and, in summer 2019, it
traded at levels higher than 10,000 USD. As we can observe from Figure 1,
such dynamics have been shared by all types of cryptocurrencies.
Cryptocurrency is the private sector counterpart of government-issued
currency (Nakamoto, 2009; Ethereum, 2014; Ripple, 2012) and is issued
in divisible units that can be easily transferred in a transaction between
two parties. Digital currencies are intrinsically useless electronic tokens
that travel through a network of computers. Advances in computer science
have allowed for the creation of a decentralized system for transferring these
electronic tokens from one person or firm to another. The key innovation
of the cryptocurrency system is the creation of a payments system across a
network of computers that does not require a trusted third party to update
balances and keep track of the ownership of the virtual units. The technology
3The CBI tracks the combined financial performance of all of the digital assets listed
for trading in the US region by Coinbase. The components of CBI are weighted by market
capitalization, defined as price multiplied by supply.
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behind the system is called Blockchain.4
The characteristics of cryptocurrency are the following ones. The
first characteristic relates to the fact that cryptocurrency is not based
on a central authority that has private information. On the contrary, it
relies on public information, such as computation, from a large number
of individual distributed computers and servers connected to each other
by the network and not by a recognized authority. Secondly, the issue of
new currency and operations are validated by the network via complex pre-
defined mathematical operations, algorithm defined as proof of work. This
kind of network approves pre-defined, encrypted and immutable operations,
so history cannot be changed and manipulated. The last characteristic refers
to the easiness of payment and management. Cryptocurrency is by definition
computer-based, and when linked to a portfolio the only requirement to
transfer value or pay bills is an internet connection.
Most of previous studies have analysed cryptocurrency empirically. For
example, Hencic and Gourieroux (2014) applied a non–causal autoregressive
model to detect the presence of bubbles in the Bitcoin/USD exchange rate.
Sapuric and Kokkinaki (2014) measured the volatility of the Bitcoin exchange
rate against six major currencies. More recently, Catania et al. (2018) have
analysed and predicted cryptocurrency volatility, whereas Catania et al.
(2019) predicted the full distribution of cryptocurrency. Both Bianchi
(2018) and Giudici and Pagnottoni (2019) have investigated the structural
relationships between cryptocurrency and other macroeconomic as well as
financial time-series.
However, there have been only a few theoretical studies that have
modelled cryptocurrency. In this regard, Boehme et al. (2015) introduced
economics, technology and governance of Bitcoin, whereas Ferna´ndez-
Villaverde and Sanches (2016) developed a model of competition among
4Cryptocurrency is just one of the many applications of Blockchain.
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privately-issued fiduciary currencies. More recently, Garratt and Wallace
(2018) and Schilling and Uhlig (2019) focused on the exchange rate of Bitcoin
and its theoretical determinants. As we will explain in the next section,
these studies have assumed partial equilibrium models and did not examine
the economic repercussions from the introduction of cryptocurrency to the
overall economy and its different sectors.
We try to fill this gap and we develop a Dynamic Stochastic General
Equilibrium (DSGE) where cryptocurrency is considered as an alternative
to government currency. This assumption is in line with Gans and
Halaburda (2019) that have defined cryptocurrency as a private digital
currency.5 Therefore, in our model, we include two separate demand shocks
to government currency and cryptocurrency, respectively. We estimate our
model with Bayesian techniques using US and cryptomarkets monthly data
for the period 2013:M6-2019:M3. Specifically we construct two new series
to proxy the quantity of cryptocurrency and the technological development,
respectively. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first attempt to
provide a general equilibrium model with cryptocurrency and to estimate its
parameters with Bayesian techniques.
Our empirical analysis indicates that the reaction of the economy to
shocks in preferences, technology and monetary policy are in line with the
findings of previous literature (see, for example, Ireland, 2004 and Andre´s
et al., 2009). In addition, the reaction of real balances for cryptocurrency is
countercyclical to output in response to these shocks. Moreover, in response
to technology and monetary policy shocks, we find a strong substitution effect
between the real balances of government currency and the real balances of
cryptocurrency. Our results also show that the economy responds differently
5Central banks often define cryptocurrency as cryptoasset because they are not yet
a full “money-like” due to their current limitations and have more uses than a form of
money payment including investment purposes (see https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/
knowledgebank/what-are-cryptocurrencies). We agree on both points but we prefer
to stick to the common terminology of cryptocurrency that has been more frequently used.
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to shocks in the demand for government currency and cryptocurrency. In
particular, government currency demand shocks have larger effects on output,
inflation and nominal interest rate. We also find that cryptocurrency
productivity shocks imply a fall in the nominal exchange rate between
government currency and cryptocurrency. The increase in the supply of
cryptocurrency leads to lower real balances of government currency due to
the substitution effect. In turn, both output and inflation fall, whereas the
inflation rate increases. However, the magnitude of these effects is much
lower than in the case of preference, technology and monetary policy shocks.
We are also able to quantify the contributions of each shock in our
model through a variance decomposition analysis. Our findings indicate that
technology, preferences and monetary policy have the highest contribution
in terms of variations in the key endogenous variables of our model. We also
find that specific supply shocks play an important role in the variation of real
balances of cryptocurrency and nominal exchange rate between government
currency and cryptocurrency. Finally, we assess the role of monetary policy
in the presence of shocks to cryptocurrency productivity. Our robustness
analysis indicates that the larger is the response of the monetary policy rule
to a change in government currency growth, the stronger is the decline in
output.
Our study also provides two policy recommendations. Firstly, we show
that an increase in cryptocurrency supply has a negative effect on output.
Therefore, the monetary authority could adjust its policy rate in response
to changes in the real balances for cryptocurrency and include a weight
for cryptocurrency growth in its policy reaction function. Secondly, we
provide evidence that the response of the nominal interest rate to changes
in government currency growth needs to be gradual in order for the central
bank to mitigate the fall in output.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the
relevant literature. Section 3 outlines the new DSGE model on which our
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study is based. In Section 4, we present the data used for the analysis and our
Bayesian estimates. Section 5 presents the impulse response functions based
on our estimated model. In Section 6, we focus on the variance decomposition
analysis, whereas Section 7 provides a robustness on different assumptions
about the monetary policy rule. The concluding remarks are found in Section
8.
2 Literature review
Our paper refers to two different streams of literature. On one hand, we
contribute to studies that have developed theoretical models to analyse and
describe cryptocurrency dynamics. However, these studies have focused
mainly on partial equilibrium models. In our work, we develop a general
equilibrium framework introducing cryptocurrency as an alternative to
government currency. On the other hand, our study also contributes to the
DSGE literature that has analysed the role of government currency in the
economy.
Regarding the first strand of literature and the theoretical models,
Boehme et al. (2015) presented a platform’s design principles and properties
of Bitcoin for a non-technical audience. They reviewed past, present, and
future uses of Bitcoin pointing out risks and regulatory issues as Bitcoin
interacts with the conventional financial system and the real economy.
Furthermore, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Sanches (2016) built a model of
competition among privately-issued fiduciary currencies.6 They found that
the lack of control over the total supply of money in circulation has critical
implications for the stability of prices across the economy. In other words,
the economy ends up in a state of hyperinflation. These authors also showed
that in the short and medium terms, the value of digital currencies goes up
6More specifically, Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Sanches (2016) extended the Lagos and
Wright (2005) model by including entrepreneurs who can issue their own currencies to
maximize profits following a predetermined algorithm (as in Bitcoin).
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and down unpredictably as a result of self-fulfilling prophecies.
Another theoretical model analysing the exchange rate between fiat
currency and Bitcoin was developed by Athey et al. (2016). In particular,
they argued that Bitcoin exchange rates can be fully determined by two
market fundamentals: the steady state transaction volume of Bitcoin when
used for payments, and the evolution of beliefs about the likelihood that the
technology survives. Garratt and Wallace (2018) also studied the behaviour
of the Bitcoin-to-Dollar exchange rate. They used the model introduced
by Samuelson (1958) with identical two-period lived overlapping generations
with one good per date. After exploring the problems of pinning down money
prices in the one-money model, these authors expanded their analysis to
include a competing outside fiat money (Bitcoin), and they also discussed
other aspects of competing cryptocurrencies.
More recently, Schilling and Uhlig (2019) also used a model in the spirit
of Samuelson (1958) assuming that there are two types of money: Bitcoins
and Dollars. Both monies can be used for transactions. These authors
found a “fundamental condition”, which is a version of the exchange-rate
indeterminacy result in Kareken and Wallace (1981) showing that the Bitcoin
price in Dollar terms follows a martingale, adjusted for the pricing kernel.
Schilling and Uhlig (2019) also found that there is a “speculative condition”,
in which the Dollar price for the Bitcoin is expected to rise, and some agents
start hoarding Bitcoin in anticipation of the price increase.
Finally, Sockin and Xiong (2018) developed a model in which the
cryptocurrency has two main roles: (i) to facilitate transactions of certain
goods among agents; (ii) as the fee to compensate coin miners for providing
clearing services for the decentralized goods transactions on the platform. As
a consequence of the first role of cryptocurrency, households face difficulty
in making such transactions as a result of severe search frictions. In turn,
such rigidity induced by the cryptocurrency price leads to either no or two
equilibria.
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However, the aforementioned theoretical studies have utilised partial
equilibrium models. In our work, we develop a general equilibrium set-up.
Many DSGE models have analysed the role of government currency in the
economy. For example, Nelson (2002) presented empirical evidence for the US
and the UK that real money base growth matters for real economic activity.
In particular, they have shown that the presence of the long-term nominal
rate in the money demand function increases the effect of nominal money
stock changes on real aggregate demand when prices are sticky.
In addition, Christiano et al. (2005) developed a model embodying
nominal and real rigidities that accounts for the observed inertia in inflation
and persistence in output. They included money among the variables of
interest and found that the interest rate and the money growth rate move
persistently in opposite directions after a monetary policy shock.
A small monetary business cycle model which contains three equations
summarizing the optimizing behaviour of the households and firms that
populate the economy was developed by Ireland (2004). This author found
that, if changes in the real stock of money have a direct impact on the
dynamics of output and inflation, then that impact must come simultaneously
through both the IS and the Phillips curve. In the same spirit, Andre´s et al.
(2009) have analysed the role of money in a general equilibrium framework
focusing on the US and the EU. Their findings uncovered the forward-looking
character of money demand.
Therefore, our work can be seen as an extension to these studies redefining
the standard DSGE model with money with the inclusion of a new sector
of the economy related to cryptocurrency generating endogenous supply
and demand in a general equilibrium framework. In the next section,
we present in detail our structural model of monetary business cycle with
cryptocurrency.
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3 Model
3.1 Households
The representative household of the economy maximizes the following
expected stream of utility:
max
{Ct,Ht,Bt,Mgt ,Mct }
E
∞∑
t=0
βtAt
[
u
(
Ct,
Mgt
Pt
Egt
,
χt
Mct
Pt
Ect
)
− ηHt
]
(1)
where 0 < β < 1 and η > 0. The budget constraint each period is given by:
M gt−1 + χt−1M
c
t−1 + Tt +Bt−1 +WtHt +Dt = PtCt +
Bt
Rt
+M gt + χtM
c
t (2)
The variable
Mgt
Pt
represents the real balance for government currency,
whereas
Mct
Pt
denotes the real balance for the cryptocurrency. Moreover, χt
indicates the nominal exchange rate between the government currency and
the cryptocurrency. In both equations (1) and (2) cryptocurrency enters as an
alternative currency with respect to government currency. Our assumption is
in line with the definition of cryptocurrency as private digital currency (Gans
and Halaburda, 2019). In particular, holding cryptocurrency gives utility to
the representative household. Moreover, since cryptocurrency is not an asset
and it does not pay any interest, the representative household purchases
cryptocurrency at t− 1 in terms of government currency, M ct−1 = M
g
t−1
χt−1
, and
holds cryptocurrency at time t as M ct =
Mgt
χt
.7
In equations (1) and (2) Ct and Ht denote household consumption and
labour supply during the period t. The shocks At, E
g
t and E
c
t follow the
7In this regard, our modelling differs from standard open economy DSGE models with
multiple currencies (see, among the others, Bodenstein et al., 2011). In these models the
exchange rate is used to convert the interest rate received by the representative household
in holding foreign bonds. On the contrary, in our model the exchange rate allows to convert
two currencies (i.e., government currency and cryptocurrency) that are used in the same
economy.
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autoregressive processes:
ln (At) = ρ
a ln (At−1) + εat (3)
ln (Egt ) = ρ
eg ln
(
Egt−1
)
+ εegt (4)
ln (Ect ) = ρ
ec ln
(
Ect−1
)
+ εect (5)
where 0 < ρa, ρeg, ρec < 1 and the zero-mean, serially uncorrelated
innovations εat , ε
eg
t and ε
ec
t are normally distributed with standard deviations
σa, σeg and σec. As we are going to show below, the shock At translates,
in equilibrium, into disturbances to the model’s IS curve, whereas Egt and
Ect indicate disturbances to government money and cryptocurrency demand
curves.
In the budget constraint, the household’s sources of funds include Tt,
a lump-sum nominal transfer received from the monetary authority at the
beginning of period t, and Bt−1, the value of nominal bonds maturing during
period t. The household’s sources of funds also include labor income, WtHt,
where Wt denotes the nominal wage, and nominal dividend payments, Dt,
received from the intermediate goods-producing firms. The household’s uses
of funds consist of consumption, Ct, of finished goods, purchased at the
nominal price, Pt, newly-issued bonds of value
Bt
Rt
, where Rt denotes the
gross nominal interest rate.
It is convenient in what follows to denote by mgt =
Mgt
Pt
and mct =
Mct
Pt
the household’s real balances for government currency and cryptocurrency,
respectively. Moreover, we denote by pit =
Pt
Pt−1
the gross inflation rate during
period t.
3.2 Entrepreneurs
We assume that there is a continuum of entrepreneurs indexed by n, where
n ∈ [0, 1], producing cryptocurrency. Each representative entrepreneur
operates under a perfect competion. Following Sockin and Xiong (2018),
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we introduce a cost of producing cryptocurrency given by: κ−φtQct , where Q
c
t
is the amount of tokens that the entrepreneur is producing. In addition:
φt = ξt + νt (6)
is the entrepreneur’s productivity, which depends on the productivity of
the other entrepreneurs via the common component, ξt, as well as on the
specific programming skills of the entrepreneur, νt. We assume that ξt and νt
represent the common and specific supply shocks to producing costs following
the autoregressive processes:
ln (ξt) = ρ
ξ ln (ξt−1) + ε
ξ
t (7)
ln (νt) = ρ
ν ln (νt−1) + ενt (8)
where 0 < ρξ, ρν < 1, and the zero-mean, serially uncorrelated innovations,
εξt and ε
ν
t , are normally distributed with standard deviations σ
ξ and
συ. Entrepreneurs also gain a fraction (1− ρ) ∈ (0, 1) from selling the
cryptocurrency to households at price Pt
χt
. Thus, entrepreneurs maximise
their profits with respect to Qct :
Πt = max{Qct}
(
(1− ρ) Pt
χt
− κ−φt
)
Qct (9)
3.3 Production Goods Firms
We assume a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms indexed
by i ∈ [0, 1] producing differentiated varieties of intermediate production
goods, and a single final production good firm combining the variety of
intermediate production goods under perfect competition. During each
period t = 0, 1, 2, ..., the representative final goods-producing firm uses Yt (i)
units of each intermediate good purchased at the nominal price, Pt (i), to
manufacture Yt (i) units of the final goods according to the constant-returns
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to-scale technology described by:
Yt =
 1∫
0
Yt (i)
(θ−1)
θ di

θ
(θ−1)
(10)
where θ > 1. The final goods-producing firm maximizes its profits by
choosing:
Yt (i) =
(
Pt (i)
Pt
)−θ
Yt (11)
which reveals that θ measures the constant price elasticity of demand for
each intermediate good. Competition drives the final goods-producing firm’s
profits to zero in equilibrium, determining Pt as:
Pt =
 1∫
0
(Pt (i))
1−θ di

1
1−θ
(12)
During each period t = 0, 1, 2, ..., the representative intermediate goods-
producing firm hires Ht (i) units of labor from the representative household
to manufacture Yt (i) units of intermediate good i according to the linear
technology:
Yt (i) = ZtHt (i) (13)
where the aggregate productivity shock, Zt, follows the autoregressive
process:
ln (Zt) = ρ
z ln (Zt−1) + εzt (14)
where 0 < ρz < 1, and the zero-mean, serially uncorrelated innovation, εzt , is
normally distributed with standard deviation σz. In equilibrium, this supply-
side disturbance acts as a shock to the Phillips curve. Since the intermediate
goods substitute imperfectly for one another in producing the final goods,
the representative intermediate goods-producing firm sells its output in a
monopolistically competitive market: the firm acts as a price-setter, but must
satisfy the representative final goods-producing firm’s demand at its chosen
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price. Similar to Rotemberg (1982), the intermediate goods-producing firm
faces a quadratic cost of adjusting its nominal price, measured in terms of
the final goods and given by:
φ
2
[
Pt (i)
piPt−1 (i)
− 1
]2
Yt (15)
with φ > 0 and pi measures the gross steady-state inflation rate. This cost
of price adjustment makes the intermediate goods-producing firm’s problem
dynamic: it chooses Pt (i) for all t = 0, 1, 2, ... to maximize its total market
value. At the end of each period, the firm distributes its profits in the form
of a nominal dividend payment, Dt (i), to the representative household.
3.4 Monetary Policy
We assume that the central bank sets the nominal interest rate following a
modified version of the Taylor (1993) rule given by:
ln
(
Rt
R
)
= ρr ln
(
Rt−1
R
)
+ (1− ρr) ρy ln
(
Yt
Y
)
+
(1− ρr) ρpi ln
(pit
pi
)
+ (1− ρr) ρµg ln
(
µgt
µg
)
+ εrt (16)
where:
µgt =
Mgt
Pt
Mgt−1
Pt−1
(17)
In equation (16), ρr, ρy, ρpi and ρµ
g
are non-negative parameters, and the
zero-mean, serially uncorrelated policy shock, εrt , is normally distributed
with standard deviation σr. The monetary authority adjusts the short-term
nominal interest rate in response to deviations of output and inflation from
their steady-state levels as well as government currency growth as shown in
equation (17). Andre´s et al. (2009) have argued that an interest-rate rule
that depends on the change in real balances for government currency may
be motivated as part of an optimal reaction function when money growth
variability appears in the central bank’s loss function. As an alternative
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explanation, the response to money growth can be justified by money’s
usefulness in forecasting inflation.
3.5 Equilibrium
The symmetric equilibrium of the model can be log-linearized to obtain the
following set of equations8:
yˆt = yˆt+1 − ω1 (rˆt − pˆit+1) + ω2
[
(mˆgt − eˆgt )−
(
mˆgt+1 − eˆgt+1
)]
+ (18)
ω3
[
(χˆt + mˆ
c
t − eˆct)−
(
χˆt+1 + mˆ
c
t+1 − eˆct+1
)]
+ ω1 (aˆt − aˆt+1)
mˆgt = γ1yˆt − γ2rˆt + γ3eˆgt − γ4χˆt − γ4mˆct + γ4eˆct (19)
mˆct = γ5yˆt − γ6rˆt + γ7eˆct − γ8χˆt − γ8mˆgt + γ8eˆgt (20)
pˆit =
( pi
R
)
pˆit+1 + ψ
 ( 1ω1) yˆt − (ω2ω1) (mˆgt − eˆgt )
−
(
ω3
ω1
)
(χˆt + mˆ
c
t − eˆct)− zˆt
 (21)
χˆt = −%φˆt (22)
φˆt =
(
ξ
φ
)
ξˆt +
(
1− ξ
φ
)
νˆt (23)
rˆt = ρ
rrˆt−1 + (1− ρr) ρyyˆt + (1− ρr) ρpipˆit + (1− ρr) ρµg µˆgt + εrt (24)
Equation (18) represents a log-linearized version of the Euler equation that
links the household’s marginal rate of intertemporal substitution to the real
interest rate. When utility is non-separable, real balances for government
currency and cryptocurrency affect the marginal rate of intertemporal
substitution; hence, they also appear in the IS curve.
Equation (19) takes the form of a money demand relationship for
government currency, with income elasticity (γ1), interest semi-elasticity (γ2),
elasticity of mˆgt with respect to government currency demand shocks (γ3), and
cross-elasticity with cryptocurrency (γ4). Moreover, equation (20) reveals
the form of a money demand relationship for cryptocurrency, with income
elasticity (γ5), interest semi-elasticity (γ6), elasticity of mˆ
c
t with respect to
8We denote by small letters with hat, xˆt, the deviation of a given variable, Xt, from
its steady state value, X. The full derivation of the model is shown in the Appendix A.
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cryptocurrency demand shocks (γ7), and cross-elasticity with government
currency (γ8).
Equation (21) is a forward-looking Phillips curve that also allows real
balances for government currency (mˆgt ) and cryptocurrency (mˆ
c
t), to enter
the specification when ω2 and ω3 are non-zero. Equations (18) and (21) also
reveal that, wherever the real balances for government currency (mˆgt ) and
cryptocurrency (mˆct) appear in the IS and Phillips curve relationships, they
are followed immediately by the money demand disturbances, eˆgt and eˆ
c
t .
Equation (22) is the log-linearized first order condition derived from
the profit maximization problem of entrepreneurs that shows a negative
relationship between the entrepreneurs’ productivity and the exchange rate
between government currency and cryptocurrency. Equation (23) is the log-
linearized expression for the entrepreneurs’ productivity that depends on the
common productivity in the cryptocurrency sector as well as on the specific
productivity of the entrepreneur. Equation (24) shows the log-linearized
relation for the monetary policy rule indicating that the interest rate adjusts
to output, inflation and government currency growth.
The cryptocurrency market is in equilibrium if the quantity of
cryptocurrency supplied by entrepreneurs is equal to the demand of
cryptocurrency by households. The goods market clearing condition implies
that the output produced by production goods firms is equal to households’
consumption. The model is closed by adding the log-linearized versions of
the AR(1) processes for the preferences shock to consumption, the demand
shocks for government currency and cryptocurrency, the common and specific
supply shocks of cryptocurrency as well as the aggregate technology shock.
4 Estimating the Model
In this section, we estimate the model described in Section 3 using Bayesian
techniques. In what follows, we initially describe the data used in order to
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estimate the model (Section 4.1). Successively, we present the parameters
of the model (Section 4.2) and their identification (Section 4.3). Finally, we
describe the estimation results (Section 4.4).
4.1 Data
The main challenge in estimating our model is the relatively short sample for
the macroeconomic series related to the market of cryptocurrency because of
its recent development. Accordingly, in order to have a sufficient number
of observations for our estimated model, we decided to use US data at
monthly frequency. Foroni and Marcellino (2014) have dealt with DSGE
models estimated with mixed frequency data including monthly data. Our
sample period corresponds to 2013:M6-2019:M3. We use seven data series in
the estimation because there are seven shocks in the theoretical model (see
Table 1).9
The seven data series include the industrial production index, the natural
log of real private consumption, the natural log of real money stock, the real
bitcoin price, the real cumulative initial coin offering (ICO), the real Nvidia
volume weighted average price and the effective federal funds rate. All the
real variables are deflated by the consumer price index (CPI). Real private
consumption and real M2 money stock are expressed in per capita terms
dividing them by working-age population.
Focusing on monetary variables, we follow Ireland (2004) by considering
money stock M2 as an indicator that includes a broader set of financial assets
held principally by households. Real bitcoin price is obtained from monthly
average of daily data assuming that the daily price is the average between
opening and closing prices. We consider the bitcoin price as representative of
the cryptocurrency price. Our choice is related to the longer sample period
that is available for the Bitcoin price compared to the CBI. Our assumption
9The data sources and the construction of all observed variables are reported in the
Appendix B.
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is plausible since, for the same sample period, the correlation between CBI
and the bitcoin price corresponds to the 99%.
The ICO or initial currency offering is a type of funding which uses
cryptocurrency. In an ICO, a quantity of cryptocurrency is sold in the
form of tokens to speculator investors, in exchange for legal tender or other
cryptocurrency. The tokens sold are promoted as future functional units of
currency if the ICO’s funding goal is met and the project is launched. The
Nvidia volume weighted average price is obtained as monthly average from
daily data. Nvidia Corporation is the most important American technology
company that designs graphics processing units (GPUs) for the gaming and
professional markets, as well as systems on chip units (SoCs) for the mobile
computing and automotive market.
4.2 Model Parameters
We decided to split the parameters of the model into two groups. The first
group of parameters is fixed and consistent with data at a monthly frequency.
In line with Ireland (2004), we assume ω1 equal to one implying the same
level of risk aversion as a utility function that is logarithmic in consumption.
The parameter ψ is fixed equal to 0.1 following King and Watson (1996),
Ireland (2000) and Ireland (2004). Such value implies that the fraction of
the discounted present value and future discrepancies between the target
price and the actual price of production goods is equal to 10%. The steady
state values for the nominal interest rate and inflation are computed from
monthly data of the effective federal funds rate and natural log changes in
CPI. For our sample period they are equal to 0.70 % and 0.13%, respectively.
The second group of parameters is estimated with the Bayesian technique
(Tables 2 and 3). To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first attempt
to estimate a DSGE model including cryptocurrency. Hence, this is one of our
main contributions and we rely on our judgement and the findings of previous
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DSGE models considering government currency (e.g., Ireland, 2000, Ireland,
2004 and Andre´s et al., 2009).
Table 2 shows the prior distributions for the endogenous parameters of
our model. For the parameter indicating the output elasticity with respect
to real balances of government currency (ω2) we assume that its prior mean
is in line with the range of estimates by Ireland (2004). On the other hand,
we assume that the prior mean of the elasticity of output with respect to real
balances of cryptocurrency (ω3) is one fourth lower than that of government
currency.
In order to set up the priors for the income elasticity of government
currency demand (γ1), the interest semi-elasticity of government currency
demand (γ2) and the elasticity of real balances of government currency with
respect to government currency demand shocks (γ3) we follow the estimated
results of Ireland (2004) for the US economy. Moreover, we assume a prior
mean value for γ4 such that changes in the demand of cryptocurrency can
affect the real balances for government currency.
Focusing on the parameters that characterize the demand relationship
for cryptocurrency, we assume that γ6 has a higher prior mean value than
γ5. Moreover, we assume that the real balances for cryptocurrency are
strongly affected by exogenous changes in cryptocurrency demand, which
corresponds to a large prior mean for γ7. Moreover, following Gans and
Halaburda (2019), we believe that cryptocurrency is a valuable alternative
to government currency and assume a high prior mean value for γ8.
In line with Athey et al. (2016) and Garratt and Wallace (2018), we
acknowledge that the exchange rate between government currency and
cryptocurrency is an important determinant of the cryptocurrency supply
and, in turn, we assume a high prior mean value for %.
Turning to the parameter measuring the relative importance of common
productivity with respect to specific productivity in the production of
cryptocurrency ( ξ
φ
), we are agnostic about its prior and, in turn, we assume
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that it covers a reasonable range of values.
Regarding the parameters of the monetary policy rule, the prior for the
degree of interest rate smoothing (ρr), the reaction coefficient of output (ρy),
the interest-rate response to inflation (ρpi) and government currency growth
(ρµ
g
) are all in line with the estimates by Andre´s et al. (2009).
Table 3 reports the priors of the parameters related to the exogenous
processes driving the economy. We set the persistence parameters of all
autoregressive exogenous processes to be Beta distributed. We assume that
the technology shock is more persistent than consumption preference and
government currency demand shocks. We also assume that the prior for
the persistence of the cryptocurrency demand shock has a relatively low
value. For both productivity shocks to cryptocurrency, we assume that
their prior means and standard deviations correspond to 0.60 and 0.05,
respectively. Finally, we use Inverse Gamma distributions for standard errors
of all exogenous shocks with means equal to 0.01 and infinite degrees of
freedom which correspond to rather loose priors.
4.3 Parameter Identification
We estimated our model using a sample of 5,000,000 draws and we dropped
the first 1,250,000.10 Our acceptation rate corresponds to 37%. In order
to test the stability of the sample, we used the Brooks and Gelman (1998)
diagnostics test, which compares within and between moments of multiple
chains. Moreover, we performed other diagnostic tests for our estimates, such
as the Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) univariate diagnostics and the
multivariate convergence diagnostics.11
As it is well known, the lack of identification in the parameter values
is a potentially serious problem for the quantitative implications of DSGE
10In order to perform our estimation analysis, we used Dynare
(http://www.dynare.org/).
11The plots for MCMC univariate and multivariate convergence diagnostics are shown
in the Appendix C.
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models (see, for example Canova and Sala, 2009). Accordingly, we compared
the prior and posterior distributions of the model parameters. For most
of the parameters we found that prior probability density functions are
wide, and posterior distributions are different from the priors.12 Moreover,
we performed the test proposed by Iskrev (2010).13 This test checks the
identification strength and sensitivity component of the parameters using a
rank condition based on the Fischer information matrix and the moment
information matrix normalized by either the parameter at the prior mean
or by the standard deviation at the prior mean. Our results show that the
derivative of the vector of predicted autocovariogram of observables with
respect to the vector of estimated parameters has full rank when we evaluate
it at the posterior mean estimate. This implies that all the parameters are
identifiable in the neighbourhood of our estimates.
4.4 Estimated Results
Tables 2 and 3 show the posterior means for the endogenous and exogenous
parameters with their 90% confidence intervals.
We start by focusing on the estimated parameters of the IS curve. From
Table 2, we note that estimated posterior of ω2 does not vary substantially
from its prior mean whereas ω3 is well identified. The estimated values for
these parameters imply that the output response to changes in real balances
of government currency is more than six times higher compared to variations
in real balances of cryptocurrency. As we will see in the next section,
this result has important consequences for the effects of cryptocurrency
productivity shocks on the economy.
Turning to the parameters of the money demand equation for government
currency, our estimated values of γ1, γ2 and γ3 are in line with the ranges
12We report the plots for prior and posterior density functions of all parameters in the
Appendix C.
13The plots showing the results for this test are reported in the Appendix D.
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of estimates provided by Ireland (2004) implying that the demand shock
(eˆgt ) has the highest influence on the movements in the real balances for
government currency. Moreover, the estimated posterior of γ4 is well
identified and indicates an important degree of substitution between the
demand of government currency and cryptocurrency.
Now we focus on the estimated parameters included in the money demand
equation for cryptocurrency. From Table 2, it is possible to note that the
posterior mean of γ6 is much higher than γ5, implying that real balances
for cryptocurrency respond more to changes in nominal interest rate than
to variations in output. As will be shown in Section (5), this result has an
important effect in terms of the response of cryptocurrency demand to the
preference shock. Moreover, we find that the posterior means of γ7 and γ8 are
above unity. These results have two main implications. Firstly, they suggest
that the demand shock (eˆct) plays a substantial role in terms of variation in the
real balances for cryptocurrency. Secondly, our estimates indicate a strong
elasticity of substitution between cryptocurrency and government currency.
This result will be discussed further in the next section. In particular, we
are going to show that the change in government currency demand greatly
affects the demand for cryptocurrency.
Focusing on the parameters related to the production of cryptocurrency,
the estimated posterior of % is well identified and has a value slightly below
unity. Our result confirms the studies by Garratt and Wallace (2018) and
Athey et al. (2016) who found that the exchange rate between government
currency and cryptocurrency is an important determinant of cryptocurrency
production. Moreover, the estimated value of ξ
φ
suggests that common
productivity has a stronger impact than the specific productivity in terms of
cryptocurrency production. This implies that common productivity shocks
have larger effects on the economy than specific productivity shocks.
Turning to the estimates of the monetary policy reaction function, we
observe that in our sample period there is significant interest-rate smoothing.
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In addition, the nominal interest rate appears to react more strongly to
variations in the inflation rate than to output changes. Interestingly, our
estimated parameter for the interest-response to government currency growth
(ρµ
g
) has a higher value than in Andre´s et al. (2009). This result suggests
that the central bank relies on the government currency growth to set up its
policy rate.
Table 3 shows the posterior estimates for the exogenous processes. In
general, the posteriors of these parameters are well identified. We note
that technology and preference shocks are more persistent than government
currency and cryptocurrency demand shocks. Moreover, we find that
the specific productivity shock to cryptocurrency production is slightly
more persistent than the common productivity shock to cryptocurrency
production. Finally, our posterior estimates show that shocks to specific
cryptocurrency productivity, cryptocurrency and government currency
demand are much more volatile than the remaining shocks.
5 Impulse Response Functions
In this section, we show the results of impulse response functions (IRFs)
for the estimated model considering some of the exogenous shocks driving
the economy. Firstly, we focus on the “traditional” shocks to preferences,
technology and monetary policy. Secondly, we analyse the shocks to
the demand of households for real balances of government currency and
cryptocurrency. Finally, we consider the “new” shocks to cryptocurrency
common and specific productivity. We consider a positive 1% shock for
each of these exogenous processes and we set the values of the estimated
parameters of the model equal to their mean estimates of the posterior
distribution.14
14Accordingly, our strategy allows us to compare the impulse responses among the
different shocks. In the Appendix E, we present the estimated impulse responses together
with their confidence intervals.
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5.1 “Traditional” Shocks
Figures 2–4 present the responses of output, real balances for government
currency and cryptocurrency, nominal exchange rate between government
currency and cryptocurrency, inflation rate, and nominal interest rate.
From Figure 2, we note that, on impact, the preferences shock increases
output and inflation by about 0.6% and 0.1%, respectively. The monetary
authority responds by increasing the nominal interest rate that achieves
its peak after two months. On impact, the real balances for government
currency increase but, only after two months they fall exhibiting a strong
inverse relationship with the nominal interest rate. These results are in
line with the findings by Ireland (2004) and Andre´s et al. (2009). Focusing
on the real balances of cryptocurrency, we observe that they decrease in
response to this shock.15 This result is a consequence of the larger estimated
value for the interest semi-elasticity (γ6) than the income elasticity of
cryptocurrency demand (γ5). Finally, we observe that the response of the
nominal exchange rate between government currency and cryptocurrency
remains almost unchanged in response to the preferences shock.
Figure 3 shows the IRFs for the technology shock. We find that a 1%
positive shock to technology increases output and the peak is achieved after
seven months and corresponds to about 0.97%. Inflation decreases on impact
by about 0.16% and it remains negative for all the periods considered in the
graph. Accordingly, the monetary authority decreases its policy rate. Real
balances for government currency exhibit an inverse relationship with the
nominal interest rate and have their peak response seven months after the
occurrence of the shock. These findings are in line with the results reported
by Ireland (2004) and Andre´s et al. (2009). Furthermore, we observe a
strong substitution effect between the real balances of cryptocurrency and
government currency. This result is a consequence of the large estimated
15On impact, the demand of cryptocurrency drops by 0.01%.
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value for cross elasticity of cryptocurrency demand and government currency
demand (γ8). Finally, our results indicate that the nominal exchange rate
between government currency and cryptocurrency is not affected by the
technological shock.
Figure 4 shows that a positive shock of 1% to monetary policy induces
an increase in the nominal interest rate by 0.7%. In response to the shock
both output and inflation fall.16 The negative response of output and the
positive response of nominal interest rate induce the fall in the demand for
government currency. These results confirm the findings of Ireland (2004)
and Andre´s et al. (2009). Moreover, our results suggest a strong substitution
effect between real balances of cryptocurrency and government currency, with
the former increasing by 0.02% on impact. However, the impulse response of
the nominal exchange rate between government currency and cryptocurrency
shows a negligible change.
Our interesting and novel results indicate that when cryptocurrency is
considered in the economy as an alternative currency option, we observe
a strong substitution effect between real balances of cryptocurrency and
government currency. In particular, our estimated model suggests that
real balances of cryptocurrency are countercyclical to output, whereas
government currency is procyclical in response to preferences, technology
and monetary shocks.”
5.2 Government Currency Demand Shocks vs.
Cryptocurrency Demand Shocks
Figure 5 presents the impulse responses to real balances of government
currency (blue lines) and cryptocurrency demand shocks (red lines).
The positive shock on government currency demand induces both real
balances of government currency and cryptocurrency to rise. This result is a
16On impact, output decreases by 2.3% and inflation by 0.5%.
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consequence of the large estimated values of γ3 and γ8. As described above,
in the IS and Phillips curves, the real balances for government currency are
immediately followed by the government currency demand shock.17 Since
the response of the shock to government currency demand is systematically
higher than that of the real balances for government currency, output
decreases and inflation rate increases.
Furthermore, we find that the nominal interest rate drops in response to
this shock. This may be explained by the fall in the government currency
growth that induces the central bank to decrease its policy rate. Finally, we
observe that the nominal exchange rate between government currency and
cryptocurrency does not move in response to the shock.
Now we focus on the effects of a positive shock to cryptocurrency demand.
We begin by noticing that the real balances of cryptocurrency increase in
response to this shock. Moreover, because of the large estimated value of
γ7, the positive response of real balances for cryptocurrency is systematically
higher than the shock to cryptocurrency demand. This implies that the real
balances for government currency fall.
From Figure 5, we also observe that the effects of this shock on output,
inflation and nominal interest rate are weak.18 This finding can be explained
by the low estimated value of ω3. In particular, on the impact of the shock,
output increases, whereas inflation rate falls from the second month onwards.
Moreover, the increase in the government currency growth leads the central
bank to raise its policy rate. Also in this case, the response of the exchange
rate between government currency and cryptocurrency is almost unchanged.
Overall, the above results indicate that shocks to government currency
demand have larger spillover effects to the economy than shocks to
cryptocurrency demand. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time
17In particular, equations (18) and (21) show a difference between the real balances for
government currency and the government currency demand disturbance.
18On impact, output increases by only the 0.01%.
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that such a result is documented in a general equilibrium framework and it
is mainly driven by our key estimated parameters.
5.3 Shocks to Cryptocurrency Productivity
The shocks to common and specific productivity of cryptocurrency are
presented in Figure 6. The impulse responses to the former shock are shown
in blue lines, whereas the impulse responses to the latter shock are in red
lines.19
In general, a positive shock to the productivity of entrepreneurs
producing cryptocurrency implies a fall in the nominal exchange rate between
government currency and cryptocurrency.20 The decrease in the exchange
rate induces an increase in the real balances of cryptocurrency.21 The demand
of government currency drops as a consequence of the substitution effect with
cryptocurrency demand. However, we note that, in terms of magnitude,
the fall in the real balances of government currency is much lower than the
increase in the real balances of cryptocurrency.22
From Figure 6 we note that output falls in response to cryptocurrency
productivity shocks. This result is a consequence of the larger estimated
value of the output elasticity to real balances of government currency (ω2)
than the output elasticity with respect to cryptocurrency (ω3). Our findings
also indicate that the change in output in response to these shocks is much
less pronounced than in the case of the “traditional” shocks.23 The reduction
19Although the magnitude of effects of common and specific productivity shocks differ,
the responses of the several macroeconomic variables to these shocks are qualitatively the
same.
20On impact, the nominal exchange rate falls by 0.45% and 0.33% in response to the
common and the specific shocks, respectively.
21In the case of a common shock the increase corresponds to 0.46%, whereas it is equal
to 0.34% for the specific shock.
22The government currency demand decreases only by 0.006% and 0.005% in response
to common and specific shocks, respectively.
23Common and specific productivity shocks induce a fall in output of only 0.002% and
0.001%, respectively.
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in aggregate output induces a decrease in the inflation rate. Moreover, the
increase in the government currency growth leads the central bank to raise
the nominal interest rate. We note that, in terms of magnitude, the changes
in both inflation and nominal interest rate are negligible compared to their
responses in the case of “traditional” shocks.24
To summarise, the common and specific productivity shocks generate
qualitatively similar reactions to the economy. In particular, the nominal
exchange rate decreases due to the higher cryptocurrency supply. This leads
to lower real balances of government currency, due to the substitution effect,
which in turn reduces the inflation rate. However, the impact to the economy
from these shocks is not as strong in comparison to the “traditional” shocks
presented earlier.
6 Variance Decomposition Analysis
Table 4 shows the importance of each shock in terms of fluctuations in
the key endogenous variables of the model. In particular, the variance
decomposition analysis is based on the simulation of the estimated model
(10,000 iterations).25 More specifically, our strategy consists of two steps. As
a first step we run the model estimation and we obtain that the parameters
and the variance matrix of the shocks are set to the mode for the maximum
likelihood estimation or posterior mode computation. As a second step, we
simulate the model so that our simulation of the estimated model is based
on the posterior modes of the model.26
In Table 4, we observe that “traditional” shocks explain most of the
24On impact, both common and specific productivity shocks induce a fall in the inflation
rate of only 0.0002%. The peak responses of nominal interest rate to common and specific
productivity shocks are 0.00002% and 0.00001%, respectively.
25Our simulation results are detrended using the HP filter with a smoothing parameter
equal to 1,600.
26In general, it is preferable to follow this approach because the exact distributions of
the posteriors are not known. Consequently, in the presence of irregular posteriors the
mode is preferred to the mean as a measure of the central tendency of the distribution.
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variations in output and inflation. In particular, the contributions of
technology shocks on both output and inflation changes are almost 90%.
The “traditional” shocks have also an important influence on the nominal
interest rate. More specifically, 89% of the variation in the nominal interest
rate is explained by a combination of technology and monetary policy shocks.
The remaining 11% is explained by preferences, government currency and
cryptocurrency demand shocks.
As expected, our results also show that government currency and
cryptocurrency demand shocks contribute to most of the variations in the
real balances for government currency and cryptocurrency (98% and 84%,
respectively). Moreover, we find that the shock to cryptocurrency specific
productivity accounts for 13% in terms of variation in the real balances
for cryptocurrency. Interestingly, the variation in the nominal exchange
rate between government currency and cryptocurrency is almost entirely
explained by shocks to cryptocurrency specific productivity.
These results are confirmed by the forecast error variance decomposition,
which we show for 1, 5, 12 and 30 periods ahead (Table 5). The “traditional”
shocks (technology, preferences and monetary policy) have the highest
contribution in terms of variations in the key endogenous variables of our
model. We also find that specific supply shocks play an important role in the
variation of cryptocurrency demand and exchange rate between government
currency and cryptocurrency.
7 Robustness Analysis: Different
Assumptions about the Taylor Rule
In this section, we investigate the role of monetary policy in the presence
of the shocks to cryptocurrency productivity. In particular, we provide a
counterfactual analysis with three different scenarios of the Taylor rule (24).
More specifically, the parameter measuring the response of the policy rate to
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government currency growth (ρµ
g
) is assumed to be: equal to its estimated
value (benchmark scenario), equal to zero (counterfactual scenario 1),27 and
equal to the double of its estimated value in our model (counterfactual
scenario 2).28
Figures 7 and 8 show the responses of the key variables of our model
in the cases of cryptocurrency common and specific productivity shocks,
respectively. The solid lines represent the impulse responses of the variables
in the benchmark scenario, whereas the dashed and dotted lines show the
impulse responses for the same variables in counterfactual scenarios 1 and 2,
respectively.
In general, the increase in the entrepreneurs’ productivity induces a
drop in the nominal exchange rate between government currency and
cryptocurrency. Accordingly, the real balances of cryptocurrency increase.
We also observe a substitution effect between cryptocurrency demand and
government currency demand with a reduction of the latter. As explained
above, these effects induce output to fall. However, from Figures 7 and 8,
we note that the magnitude of this decrease is different between the three
scenarios. This result clearly depends on the response of the central bank
to cryptocurrency (common and specific) productivity shocks. When the
monetary authority does not consider government currency growth in the
Taylor rule (counterfactual scenario 1), the nominal interest rate falls. In
turn, the fall in the output is less pronounced than in the benchmark case.
On the contrary, when the weight of government currency growth in the
Taylor rule is higher (counterfactual scenario 2), the increase in the nominal
interest rate is larger than in the benchmark case. In turn, this effect induces
a larger fall in output.
The different magnitude of the fall in output between the three alternative
27This assumption implies no weight of government currency growth in the Taylor rule.
28This assumption implies a higher weight of government currency growth in the Taylor
rule.
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scenarios has also consequences on the inflation rate. As it can be observed
from Figures 7 and 8, in counterfactual scenario 2, inflation falls more than in
the benchmark case whereas, in counterfactual scenario 1 slightly increases.29
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed and estimated a Dynamic Stochastic
General Equilibrium (DSGE) model to evaluate the economic repercussions
of cryptocurrency. Our model assumed that the representative household
maximizes its utility accounting also for cryptocurrency holdings. Moreover,
in our theoretical framework, we included entrepreneurs that determine the
supply of cryptocurrency in the economy. We estimated our model using US
monthly data and we compared our empirical findings with the “state-of-art”
models without cryptocurrency.
We provided an impulse response analysis to show the effects of
preferences, technology and monetary policy shocks on the real balances
of government currency as well as to the real balances of cryptocurrency.
Moreover, we evaluated the responses of main macroeconomic fundamentals
to productivity shocks for production of cryptocurrency.
We found a strong substitution effect between the real balances of
government currency and the real balances of cryptocurrency in response to
technology, preferences and monetary policy shocks. Moreover, government
currency demand shocks had larger effects on the economy than shocks to
cryptocurrency demand. We also found that cryptocurrency productivity
shocks imply a fall in the nominal exchange rate. Output and inflation fall
whereas the nominal interest rate increases. However, the magnitude of the
effects of these shocks was much lower than the “traditional” shocks.
Overall, our work provides novel insights and new evidence on the
29The small increase in inflation in counterfactual scenario 1 is also due to the fall in
the nominal interest rate.
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underlying mechanisms of cryptocurrency and the spillover effects it has
on the economy. This can provide guidance to investors, policy makers,
central bankers and researchers, on how to act towards cryptocurrency and its
ecosystem in the future. In particular, two policy recommendations emerge
from our analysis. Firstly, we have shown that an increase in cryptocurrency
supply has a negative effect on output. Therefore, the monetary authority
could decide to adjust its policy rate in response to changes in the real
balances for cryptocurrency, including a weight for cryptocurrency growth, in
its policy reaction function. Secondly, we provided evidence that the response
of the nominal interest rate to changes in government currency growth needs
to be gradual if the central bank wants to avoid a fall in output.
Our analysis opens several extensions. For example, our estimated
DSGE framework could be extended to a two-country exercise, extending
studies on global cryptocurrency such as Benigno et al. (2019), or even to a
heterogeneous household setup.
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Output Real Bal. for Gov. Curr.
Real Bal. for Crypto. Nom. Ex. Rate btw. Gov. Curr. and Crypto.
Inflation Nom. Int. Rate
Figure 2: Responses to Preferences Shock
Notes: Simulated 1% shock to household preference.
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Output Real Bal. for Gov. Curr.
Real Bal. for Crypto. Nom. Ex. Rate btw. Gov. Curr. and Crypto.
Inflation Nom. Int. Rate
Figure 3: Responses to Technology Shock
Notes: Simulated 1% shock to technology.
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Output Real Bal. for Gov. Curr.
Real Bal. for Crypto. Nom. Ex. Rate btw. Gov. Curr. and Crypto.
Inflation Nom. Int. Rate
Figure 4: Responses to Monetary Policy Shock
Notes: Simulated 1% shock to monetary policy.
40
Output Real Bal. for Gov. Curr.
Real Bal. for Crypto. Nom. Ex. Rate btw. Gov. Curr. and Crypto.
Inflation Nom. Int. Rate
Gov. Curr. Growth Gov. Curr. Dem. Shock
Crypto. Dem. Shock
Figure 5: Responses to Government Currency and Cryptocurrency Demand
Shocks
Notes: Simulated 1% shocks to government currency and cryptocurrency demands. Blue
lines denote the responses to a government currency demand shock, whereas red lines
represent the responses to a cryptocurrency demand shock.
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Output Real Bal. for Gov. Curr.
Real Bal. for Crypto. Nom. Ex. Rate btw. Gov. Curr. and Crypto.
Inflation Nom. Int. Rate
Gov. Curr. Growth
Figure 6: Responses to Cryptocurrency Productivity Shocks
Notes: Simulated 1% shocks to common and specific productivity of cryptocurrency. Blue
lines denote the responses to a common productivity shock of cryptocurrency, whereas red
lines represent the responses to a specific productivity shock of cryptocurrency.
42
Output Real Bal. for Gov. Curr.
Real Bal. for Crypto. Nom. Ex. Rate btw. Gov. Curr. and Crypto.
Inflation Nom. Int. Rate
Gov. Curr. Growth
Figure 7: Robustness: Responses to Cryptocurrency Common Productivity
Shock
Notes: Solid lines denote the IRFs of the benchmark model, whereas the dashed and
dotted lines represent the responses of the model in counterfactual scenarios 1 and 2,
respectively.
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Output Real Bal. for Gov. Curr.
Real Bal. for Crypto. Nom. Ex. Rate btw. Gov. Curr. and Crypto.
Inflation Nom. Int. Rate
Gov. Curr. Growth
Figure 8: Robustness: Responses to Cryptocurrency Specific Productivity
Shock
Notes: Solid lines denote the IRFs of the benchmark model, whereas the dashed and
dotted lines represent the responses of the model in counterfactual scenarios 1 and 2,
respectively.
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Table 1: Exogenous Shocks and Observed Variables
Shocks Observed Variables
Technology Shock US Industrial Production Index
Shock to Household’s Preferences US Real Private Consumption
Shock to Household’s Demand for Government Currency US Real Balances for Government Currency
Shock to Household’s Demand for Cryptocurrency Real Bitcoin Price
Common Supply Shock of Cryptocurrency Real Cumulative Initial Coin Offering (ICO)
Specific Supply Shock of Cryptocurrency Real Nvidia Volume Weighted Average Price
Monetary Policy Shock US Nominal Interest Rate
Notes: The data sources and the construction of all observed variables are reported in the
Appendix B.
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Table 2: Priors and Posteriors for the Endogenous Parameters
Parameter Symbol Priors Posteriors
Dist. Mean St. Dev. Mean Conf. Inter.
Output El. to Real Bal. of Gov. Currency ω2 G 0.200 0.050 0.195 0.102 0.284
Output El. to Real Bal. of Cryptourrency ω3 G 0.050 0.010 0.035 0.024 0.046
Income El. of Gov. Currency Demand γ1 G 0.015 0.005 0.021 0.009 0.032
Interest Semi-El. of Gov. Currency Demand γ2 G 0.150 0.050 0.140 0.066 0.214
El. of Real Bal. of Gov. Curr. wrt Gov. Curr. Dem. Shock γ3 G 0.900 0.100 0.664 0.593 0.733
Cross El. of Gov. Cur. Dem. and Crypto. Dem. γ4 G 0.500 0.050 0.554 0.467 0.638
Income El. Cryptocurrency Demand γ5 G 0.015 0.005 0.013 0.006 0.020
Interest Semi-El. of Cryptocurrency Demand γ6 G 0.150 0.050 0.155 0.073 0.236
El. of Real Bal. of Crypto. wrt Crypto. Dem. Shock γ7 G 0.800 0.100 1.034 1.014 1.053
Cross El. of Crypto. Dem. and Gov. Cur. Dem. γ8 G 0.600 0.100 1.011 0.985 1.037
Ex. Rate Crypto. / Gov. Cur. El. wrt Prod. % G 0.900 0.100 0.777 0.638 0.916
Share of Crypto. Common Prod. on Crypto. Tot. Prod. ξφ G 0.500 0.050 0.572 0.482 0.662
Interest. Rate Smoothing ρr B 0.800 0.050 0.808 0.765 0.852
Taylor Rule Coef. on Output ρy B 0.200 0.010 0.153 0.142 0.163
Taylor Rule Coef. on Inflation ρpi G 1.800 0.050 1.980 1.900 2.063
Taylor Rule Coef. on Gov. Currency Growth ρµ
g
B 0.200 0.050 0.459 0.368 0.555
Table 3: Priors and Posteriors for the Shock Processes Parameters
Parameter Symbol Priors Posteriors
Distr. Mean St. Dev. Mean Conf. Inter.
Household’s Preference Shock Pers. ρa B 0.700 0.050 0.668 0.586 0.751
Gov. Cur. Demand Shock Pers. ρeg B 0.650 0.050 0.623 0.548 0.700
Crypto. Demand Shock Pers. ρec .B 0.550 0.050 0.622 0.554 0.690
Technology Shock Pers. ρz B 0.900 0.050 0.996 0.992 0.999
Crypto. Common Prod. Shock Pers. ρξ B 0.600 0.050 0.679 0.616 0.742
Crypto. Specific Prod. Shock Pers. ρν B 0.600 0.050 0.703 0.642 0.765
Household’s Preference Shock St. Err. σa I-G 0.010 Inf 0.278 0.238 0.315
Gov. Cur. Demand Shock St. Err. σeg I-G 0.010 Inf 1.578 0.824 2.320
Crypto. Demand Shock St. Err. σec I-G 0.010 Inf 3.799 3.065 4.538
Technology Shock St. Err. σz I-G 0.010 Inf 0.734 0.611 0.853
Crypto. Common Prod. Shock St. Err.. σξ I-G 0.010 Inf 0.047 0.041 0.054
Crypto. Specific Prod. Shock St. Err.. σν I-G 0.010 Inf 4.763 4.071 5.436
Monetary Policy Shock St. Err. σr I-G 0.010 Inf 0.076 0.059 0.091
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Table 4: Variance Decomposition (%)
yˆt pˆit rˆt mˆ
g
t mˆ
c
t χˆt
σa 3.52 4.04 8.07 0.01 0.00 0.00
σeg 3.08 2.78 1.41 83.08 7.09 0.00
σec 0.24 0.30 2.15 15.85 79.29 0.00
σz 89.02 84.20 60.74 0.66 0.00 0.00
σξ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
σν 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 13.61 99.98
σr 4.14 8.68 27.63 0.08 0.00 0.00
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Table 5: Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (%)
Period 1
yˆt pˆit rˆt mˆ
g
t mˆ
c
t χˆt
σa 6.41 4.82 6.68 0.00 0.00 0.00
σeg 5.49 2.41 1.29 83.45 7.17 0.00
σec 0.41 0.25 1.97 15.86 80.23 0.00
σz 80.49 82.69 28.03 0.30 0.00 0.00
σξ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
σν 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.29 12.60 99.98
σr 7.19 9.82 62.04 0.09 0.00 0.00
Period 5
yˆt pˆit rˆt mˆ
g
t mˆ
c
t χˆt
σa 1.48 1.84 6.04 0.01 0.00 0.00
σeg 1.38 1.72 1.02 82.39 7.02 0.00
σec 0.08 0.12 1.56 15.76 78.35 0.00
σz 95.14 91.69 75.72 1.43 0.00 0.00
σξ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
σν 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34 14.62 99.98
σr 1.91 4.63 15.65 0.08 0.00 0.00
Period 12
yˆt pˆit rˆt mˆ
g
t mˆ
c
t χˆt
σa 0.59 0.99 2.54 0.01 0.00 0.00
σeg 0.55 0.95 0.42 80.39 7.00 0.00
σec 0.04 0.07 0.64 15.38 78.11 0.00
σz 98.06 95.49 90.49 3.81 0.00 0.00
σξ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
σν 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.34 14.89 99.98
σr 0.76 2.49 5.92 0.07 0.00 0.00
Period 30
yˆt pˆit rˆt mˆ
g
t mˆ
c
t χˆt
σa 0.25 0.49 1.03 0.01 0.00 0.00
σeg 0.23 0.46 0.17 76.08 7.00 0.00
σec 0.01 0.03 0.26 14.56 78.10 0.00
σz 99.19 97.80 96.13 8.97 0.01 0.00
σξ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
σν 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 14.89 99.98
σr 0.32 1.22 2.41 0.07 0.00 0.00
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1 Appendix A: Model Solution
1.1 First Order Conditions
The representative household chooses Ct, Ht, Bt, M
g
t and M
c
t for all t =
0, 1, 2, ... to maximize its expected utility, subject to its budget constraints.
The first-order conditions for this problem can be written as fllows.
The first order condition for Ct is given by:
λt = −Atu1
(
Ct,
mgt
Egt
,
χtm
c
t
Ect
)
1
Pt
(A1)
mgt =
Mgt
Pt
and mct =
Mct
Pt
, whereas λt is the Lagrange multiplier associated
with the representative household budget constraint. Moreover, u1 denotes
the derivative of the utility function, u, with respect to its first argument.
The first order condition for Ht is given by:
− Atη − λtwt = 0 (A2)
where wt =
Wt
Pt
.
Combining equations (A1) and (A2) we obtain:
η = u1
(
Ct,
mgt
Egt
,
χtm
c
t
Ect
)
wt (A3)
The first order condition for Bt is given by:
Atu1
(
Ct,
mgt
Egt
,
χtm
c
t
Ect
)
= βRt
[
At+1u1
(
Ct+1,
mgt+1
Egt+1
,
χt+1m
c
t+1
Ect+1
)]
1
pit+1
(A4)
where pit =
Pt
Pt−1
.
The first order condition for M gt is given by:
Rtu2
(
Ct,
mgt
Egt
,
χtm
c
t
Ect
)
= (Rt − 1)Egt u1
(
Ct,
mgt
Egt
,
χtm
c
t
Ect
)
(A5)
where u2 denotes the derivative of the utility function, u, with respect to its
second argument.
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The first order condition for M ct is given by:
Rtu3
(
Ct,
mgt
Egt
,
χtm
c
t
Ect
)
= (Rt − 1)Ectu1
(
Ct,
mgt
Egt
,
χtm
c
t
Ect
)
(A6)
where u3 denotes the derivative of the utility function, u, with respect to its
third argument.
The market clearing conditions imply that:
M gt = M
g
t−1 + Tt
M ct = M
c
t−1
Bt = Bt−1 = 0
Therefore, from the household’s budget constraint we obtain that:
wtHt + dt = Ct (A7)
where dt =
Dt
Pt
.
The representative entrepreneur chooses Qct for all t = 0, 1, 2, ... to
maximize its profit given by:
Πt = max{Qct}
(
(1− ρ) Pt
χt
− κ−φt
)
Qct
The first-order condition for this problem is:
(1− ρ) 1
χt
=
1
Pt
κ−φt (A8)
Moreover, from equation (6) in the maintext, we know that the
entrepreneur’s productivity is given by:
ωt = ξt + νt (A9)
The representative intermediate goods-producing firm chooses Pt (i) for
all t = 0, 1, 2, ... to maximize its total market value, given by:
E
∞∑
t=0
βAtu1
(
Ct,
mgt
Egt
,
χtm
c
t
Ect
)[
Dt (i)
Pt
]
4
where βAtu1
(
Ct,
mgt
Egt
,
χtmct
Ect
)
measures the marginal utility value to the
representative household of an additional dollar in profits received during
period t. Moreover:
Dt (i)
Pt
=
[
Pt (i)
Pt
]1−θ
Yt−
[
Pt (i)
Pt
]−θ (
wtYt
Zt
)
− φ
2
[
Pt (i)
piPt−1 (i)
− 1
]2
Yt (A10)
for all t = 0, 1, 2, ...
The expression (A10) for the firm’s real dividend payment incorporates
the linear production function along with the requirement that the firm
supply output on demand; it also shows how the cost of price adjustment
subtracts from profits. The first-order conditions for this problem are:
0 = (1− θ)
[
Pt (i)
Pt
]−θ (
Yt
Pt
)
+
θ
[
Pt (i)
Pt
]−θ−1(
Ytwt
ZtPt
)
− φ
[
Pt (i)
piPt−1 (i)
− 1
] [
Yt
piPt−1 (i)
]
+ (A11)
βφE

At+1u1
(
Ct+1,
mgt+1
Egt+1
,
χt+1mct+1
Ect+1
)
Atu1
(
Ct,
mgt
Egt
,
χtmct
Ect
)
[Pt+1 (i)
piPt (i)
− 1
] [
Yt+1Pt+1 (i)
piPt (i)
2
]
for all t = 0, 1, 2, ...
In a symmetric equilibrium:
Yt (i) = Yt
Ht (i) = Ht
Pt (i) = Pt
Dt (i) = Dt
and:
Yt = ZtHt
for all i ∈ [0, 1] and t = 0, 1, 2, ... equations (A7) and (A10) can be combined
to derive the economy’s aggregate resource constraint:
Yt = Ct +
φ
2
[pit
pi
− 1
]2
Yt (A12)
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Combining equations (A3) and (A11) we obtain:
θ − 1 = θ
 η
Ztu1
(
Ct,
mgt
Egt
,
χtmct
Ect
)
− φ(pit
pi
− 1
)(pit
pi
)
+ (A13)
βφE

At+1u1
(
Ct+1,
mgt+1
Egt+1
,
χt+1mct+1
Ect+1
)
Atu1
(
Ct,
mgt
Egt
,
χtmct
Ect
)
(pit+1
pi
− 1
)(Yt+1
Yt
)(pit+1
pi
)
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1.2 Steady State Relations
In the absence of shocks, the economy converges to a steady state, in which:
Yt = Y
Ct = C
mgt = m
g
χt = χ
mct = m
c
pit = pi
Rt = R
From equation (A4) we have that:
R =
pi
β
(A14)
From equation (A12) we have that:
Y = C (A15)
From equation (A5) we have that:
Rtu2
(
Y,
mg
Eg
,
χmc
Ec
)
= (R− 1)Egu1
(
Y,
mg
Eg
,
χmc
Ec
)
(A16)
From equation (A6) we have that:
Rtu3
(
Y,
mg
Eg
,
χmc
Ec
)
= (R− 1)Ecu1
(
Y,
mg
Eg
,
χmc
Ec
)
(A17)
From equation (A8) we have that:
(1− ρ) 1
χ
= κ−φ (A18)
From equation (A9) we have that:
ν
φ
= 1− ξ
φ
(A19)
From equation (A13) we have that:
(θ − 1)Zu1
(
Y,
mg
Eg
,
χmc
Ec
)
= θη (A20)
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1.3 Log-linearized Equations
We denote:
yˆt = ln
(
Yt
Y
)
cˆt = ln
(
Ct
C
)
mˆgt = ln
(
mgt
mg
)
χˆt = ln
(
χt
χ
)
mˆct = ln
(
mct
mc
)
pˆit = ln
(pit
pi
)
rˆt = ln
(
Rt
R
)
aˆt = ln
(
At
A
)
eˆgt = ln
(
Egt
Eg
)
eˆct = ln
(
Ect
Ec
)
ξˆt = ln
(
ξt
ξ
)
νˆt = ln
(νt
ν
)
zˆt = ln
(
Zt
Z
)
µˆgt = ln
(
µgt
µg
)
The first-order Taylor approximation to equation (A12) gives:
yˆt = cˆt (A21)
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The first-order Taylor approximation to equation (A4) gives:
yˆt = yˆt+1 − ω1 (rˆt − pˆit+1) + ω2
[
(mˆgt − eˆgt )−
(
mˆgt+1 − eˆgt+1
)]
+ (A22)
ω3
[
(χˆt + mˆ
c
t − eˆct)−
(
χˆt+1 + mˆ
c
t+1 − eˆct+1
)]
+ ω1 (aˆt − aˆt+1)
where:
ω1 = −
u1
(
Y, m
g
Eg
, χm
c
Ec
)
Y u11
(
Y, m
g
Eg
, χm
c
Ec
) (A23)
ω2 = −
mg
Eg
u12
(
Y, m
g
Eg
, χm
c
Ec
)
Y u11
(
Y, m
g
Eg
, χm
c
Ec
) (A24)
ω3 = −
χmc
Ec
u13
(
Y, m
g
Eg
, χm
c
Ec
)
Y u11
(
Y, m
g
Eg
, χm
c
Ec
) (A25)
The first-order Taylor approximation to equation (A5) gives:
mˆgt = γ1yˆt − γ2rˆt + γ3eˆgt − γ4χˆt − γ4mˆct + γ4eˆct (A26)
where:
γ1 =
(
R− 1 + Y Rω2
mg
)(
γ2
ω1
)
(A27)
γ2 =
R
(R− 1) mg
Eg
[
u2
(
Y, m
g
Eg
, m
c
Ec
)
(R− 1)Egu12
(
Y, m
g
Eg
, m
c
Ec
)−Ru22 (Y, mgEg , mcEc )
]
(A28)
γ3 = 1− (R− 1) γ2 (A29)
γ4 =
χmc
Ec
mg
Eg
 u23(Y,
mg
Eg
,m
c
Ec )
u22(Y,m
g
Eg
,m
c
Ec )−(
(R−1)
R
Eg)u12(Y,m
g
Eg
,m
c
Ec )
−
u13(Y,m
g
Eg
,m
c
Ec )
( R(R−1)
1
Eg )u22(Y,
mg
Eg
,m
c
Ec )−u12(Y,m
g
Eg
,m
c
Ec )
 (A30)
The first-order Taylor approximation to equation (A6) gives:
mˆct = γ5yˆt − γ6rˆt + γ7eˆct − γ8χˆt − γ8mˆgt + γ8eˆgt (A31)
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where:
γ5 =
(
R− 1 + Y Rω3
χmc
)(
γ6
ω1
)
(A32)
γ6 =
R
(R− 1) χmc
Ec
[
u3
(
Y, m
g
Eg
, χm
c
Ec
)
(R− 1)Ecu13
(
Y, m
g
Eg
, χm
c
Ec
)−Ru33 (Y, mgEg , χmcEc )
]
(A33)
γ7 = 1− (R− 1) γ6 (A34)
γ8 =
mg
Eg
χmc
Ec

u32
(
Y,m
g
Eg
,χm
c
Ec
)
u33(Y,m
g
Eg
,χm
c
Ec )−(
(R−1)
R
Ec)u13(Y,m
g
Eg
,χm
c
Ec )
−
u12
(
Y,m
g
Eg
,χm
c
Ec
)
( R(R−1)
1
Ec )u33(Y,
mg
Eg
,χm
c
Ec )−u13(Y,m
g
Eg
,χm
c
Ec )
 (A35)
Since in steady-state P = 1, the log-linearized expression for (A8) is given
by:
χˆt = −%φˆt (A36)
where % = φ ln (κ).
The log-linearized expression for (A9) is given by:
ωˆt =
(
ξ
ω
)
ξˆt +
(
1− ξ
ω
)
νˆt (A37)
The first-order Taylor approximation to equation (A13) gives:
pˆit =
( pi
R
)
pˆit+1 + ψ
 ( 1ω1) yˆt − (ω2ω1) (mˆgt − eˆgt )
−
(
ω3
ω1
)
(χˆt + mˆ
c
t − eˆct)− zˆt
 (A38)
where:
ψ =
(θ − 1)
φ
(A39)
Equation (A23) shows that ω1 depends inversely on the household’s
relative risk aversion. Equation (A24) and (A25) indicate that ω2 > 0
and ω3 > 0, so that changes in real balances for government currencies and
cryptocurrencies enter into the IS and Phillips curves, if and only if u12 > 0
and u13 > 0, so that utility is non-separable across consumption and real
balances for government currency and cryptocurrencies. Finally, equation
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(A40) reveals that the parameter ψ in the Phillips curve, equation (A39), is
inversely related to the cost-of-price-adjustment parameter, φ.
Finally, the log-linearization of the Taylor rule (16) in the main text gives:
rˆt = ρ
rrˆt−1 + (1− ρr) ρyyˆt + (1− ρr) ρpipˆit + (1− ρr) ρµg µˆgt + εrt (40)
11
2 Appendix B: Data Construction and
Sources
As we described in the main body of the paper, the data is montly and
the model is estimated for the sample period 2013:M6-2019:M3. Here, we
provide the sources and construction methods of the observed series. Unless
otherwise noted, all original series are seasonally adjusted.
US Industrial Production Index. The US industrial production
index, index 2012=100, is taken from the Federal Reserve Bank of
St. Louis (code INDPRO in Federal Reserve Economic Data, link:
https://fred.stlouisfed.org).
US Real Private Consumption. It is obtained from the series of
personal consumption expenditures, billions of Dollars, and it is taken from
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (code PCE in Federal Reserve
Economic Data, link: https://fred.stlouisfed.org). The original series is
deflated by the consumer price index for all urban consumers, all items,
index 1982-1984=100 (code CPIAUCSL in Federal Reserve Economic Data,
link: https://fred.stlouisfed.org), divided by the civilian employment level,
thousands of persons (code CE16OV in Federal Reserve Economic Data, link:
https://fred.stlouisfed.org) and expressed in log terms.
US Real Balances of Government Currency. It is obtained from
the series of M2 money stock, billions of Dollars, and it is taken from
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (code M2 in Federal Reserve
Economic Data, link: https://fred.stlouisfed.org). The original series is
deflated by the consumer price index for all urban consumers, all items,
index 1982-1984=100 (code CPIAUCSL in Federal Reserve Economic Data,
link: https://fred.stlouisfed.org), divided by the civilian employment level,
thousands of persons (code CE16OV in Federal Reserve Economic Data, link:
https://fred.stlouisfed.org) and expressed in log terms.
Real Bitcoin Price. It is obtained as the average of the series of
12
opening and closing prices and it is taken from CoinMarketCap (link:
https://coinmarketcap.com). The monthly series is obtained as average
from daily data and is deflated by the consumer price index for all urban
consumers, all items, index 1982-1984=100 (code CPIAUCSL in Federal
Reserve Economic Data, link: https://fred.stlouisfed.org).
Real cumulative ICO funding. It is obtained from the series of
cumulative initial coin offering (ICO) funding, millions of Dollars, and it is
taken from the CoinDesk ICO Tracker (link: https://www.coindesk.com/ico-
tracker). For 2013:M6-2014:M1, we applied the growth rate of the series of
Bitcoin average market cap (link: https://coinmarketcap.com, the monthly
series was obtained as average from daily data). The final series of cumulative
ICO funding was deflated by the consumer price index for all urban
consumers, all items, index 1982-1984=100 (code CPIAUCSL in Federal
Reserve Economic Data, link: https://fred.stlouisfed.org).
Real Nvidia Volume Weighted Average Price. It is obtained from
the series of Nvidia volume weighted average price and it is downloaded
from Thomson Reuters Eikon. The monthly series was obtained as average
from daily data and is deflated by the consumer price index for all urban
consumers, all items, index 1982-1984=100 (code CPIAUCSL in Federal
Reserve Economic Data, link: https://fred.stlouisfed.org).
US Nominal Interest Rate. The US nominal interest rate is the series
of effective Federal funds rate, %, and it is taken from the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis (code FEDFUNDS in Federal Reserve Economic Data,
link: https://fred.stlouisfed.org).
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3 Appendix C: Diagnostic Tests
3.1 Prior and Posterior Distributions
In the graphs below, the gray lines represent the prior distributions while the
black lines correspond to the posterior distributions.
σa σeg σec
σz σξ σν
σr ρa ρeg
ρec ρz ρξ
ρν ω2 ω3
γ1 γ2 γ3
14
γ4 γ5 γ6
γ7 γ8 ρ
ξ
φ
ρr ρy
ρpi ρµ
g
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3.2 Monte Carlo Markov Chain Univariate
Diagnostics
In the graphs below, the first column with the label “Interval” shows the
Brooks and Gelman (1998) convergence diagnostics for the 80% interval.
The blue line represents the 80% interval range based on the pooled draws
from all sequences, whereas the red line indicates the mean interval based
on the draws of the individual sequences. The second and the third column
with labels “M2” and “M3” denote an estimate of the same statistics for the
second and third central moments.
σa (Interval) σa (M2) σa (M3)
σeg (Interval) σeg (M2) σeg (M3)
σec (Interval) σec (M2) σec (M3)
σz (Interval) σz (M2) σz (M3)
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σξ (Interval) σξ (M2) σξ (M3)
σν (Interval) σν (M2) σν (M3)
σr (Interval) σr (M2) σr (M3)
ρa (Interval) ρa (M2) ρa (M3)
ρeg (Interval) ρeg (M2) ρeg (M3)
ρec (Interval) ρec (M2) ρec (M3)
ρz (Interval) ρz (M2) ρz (M3)
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ρξ (Interval) ρξ (M2) ρξ (M3)
ρν (Interval) ρν (M2) ρν (M3)
ω2 (Interval) ω2 (M2) ω2 (M3)
ω3 (Interval) ω3 (M2) ω3 (M3)
γ1 (Interval) γ1 (M2) γ1 (M3)
γ2 (Interval) γ2 (M2) γ2 (M3)
γ3 (Interval) γ3 (M2) γ3 (M3)
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γ4 (Interval) γ4 (M2) γ4 (M3)
γ5 (Interval) γ5 (M2) γ5 (M3)
γ6 (Interval) γ6 (M2) γ6 (M3)
γ7 (Interval) γ7 (M2) γ7 (M3)
γ8 (Interval) γ8 (M2) γ8 (M3)
ρ (Interval) ρ (M2) ρ (M3)
ξ
φ
(Interval) ξ
φ
(M2) ξ
φ
(M3)
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ρr (Interval) ρr (M2) ρr (M3)
ρy (Interval) ρy (M2) ρy (M3)
ρpi (Interval) ρpi (M2) ρpi (M3)
ρµ
g
(Interval) ρµ
g
(M2) ρµ
g
(M3)
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3.3 Multivariate Convergence Diagnostics
In the graphs below, the diagnostics is based on the range of the posterior
likelihood function. The posterior kernel is used to aggregate the parameters.
80% Interval
Second Central Moment
Third Central Moment
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3.4 Smoothed Shocks
In the graphs below, the black lines represent the estimates of the smoothed
structural shocks derived from the Kalman smoother.
εa εeg
εec εz
εξ εν
εr
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3.5 Historical and Smoothed Variables
In the graphs below, the dotted black lines indicate the observed data whereas
the red lines indicate the estimates of the smoothed variables derived from
the Kalman smoother.
Industrial Production Index Real Balances of Government Currency
Real Bitcoin Price Real Private Consumption
Real cumulative ICO funding Real Nvidia Volume Weighted Average Price
Nominal Interest Rate
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4 Appendix D: Identification Tests
In the top panel, the bar charts represent the identification strength of the
parameters based on the Fischer information matrix normalised by either the
parameter at the prior mean (blue bars) or by the standard deviation at the
prior mean (orange bars).
In the bottom panel, we show the sensitivity component of the parameters
based on the moments information matrix normalised by either the parameter
at the prior mean (blue bars) or by the standard deviation at the prior mean
(orange bars).
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5 Appendix E: Estimated Impulse Response
Functions
Output Real Bal. for Gov. Curr.
Real Bal. for Crypto. Inflation
Nom. Int. Rate
Responses to preferences shock. The graph shows the responses of the key variables
together with the 95% confidence intervals.
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Output Real Bal. for Gov. Curr.
Real Bal. for Crypto. Inflation
Nom. Int. Rate
Responses to technology shock. The graph shows the responses of the key variables
together with the 95% confidence intervals.
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Output Real Bal. for Gov. Curr.
Real Bal. for Crypto. Inflation
Nom. Int. Rate
Responses to monetary policy shock. The graph shows the responses of the key variables
together with the 95% confidence intervals.
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Output Real Bal. for Gov. Curr.
Real Bal. for Crypto. Inflation
Nom. Int. Rate Gov. Curr. Growth
Gov. Curr. Dem. Shock
Responses to government currency demand shock. The graph shows the responses of the
key variables together with the 95% confidence intervals.
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Output Real Bal. for Gov. Curr.
Real Bal. for Crypto. Inflation
Nom. Int. Rate Gov. Curr. Growth
Gov. Curr. Dem. Shock
Responses to cryptocurrency demand shock. The graph shows the responses of the key
variables together with the 95% confidence intervals.
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Output Real Bal. for Gov. Curr.
Real Bal. for Crypto. Nom. Ex. Rate btw. Gov. Curr. and Crypto.
Inflation Nom. Int. Rate
Gov. Curr. Growth
Responses to cryptocurrency common productivity shock. The graph shows the responses
of the key variables together with the 95% confidence intervals.
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Output Real Bal. for Gov. Curr.
Real Bal. for Crypto. Nom. Ex. Rate btw. Gov. Curr. and Crypto.
Inflation Nom. Int. Rate
Gov. Curr. Growth
Responses to cryptocurrency specific productivity shock. The graph shows the responses
of the key variables together with the 95% confidence intervals.
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